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In the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah 
ZION'S SERVICE CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
H. A. DANIELSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
No. 9232 
Brief of Defendant and Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff in this action (respondent herein) 
filed suit against defendant (appellant herein) al-
leging that defendant owed plaintiff Three Thou-
sand Six Hundred Twenty-Six ($3,626.00) Dollars 
plus interest on a contract between plaintiff and de-
fendant. 
At the time the plaintiff Corporation was organ-
ized in December of 1955, the defendant was listed 
as one or the original incorporators. The Articles 
.of Incorporation of Plaintiffs corporation states that 
one of the purposes of the corporation was- to pro-
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vide quantities estimates for Masonry Contractors 
on the jobs they were to bid, that is, to figure out 
the quantity of bricks, mortar, etc., which the con-
tractor would have to use on the job so that he 
could make his estimate of costs from this quantities 
estimate. 
The Minute Book of the Board o.f Directors of 
Plaintiff Corporation shows that on January 3, 1956, 
a motion was made and passed that the contractor 
members of the corporation were to pay to the cor-
poration l 'Yo on housing projects from one to ten 
houses; 2'Ya on projects of eleven to twenty-five 
houses; and 3o/o on projects of more than twenty-five 
houses. Further, on projects other than houses, they 
were to pay l a;o of jobs up to $10,000.00, 2'Ya on jobs 
up to $25,000.00 and 3'Ya on jobs over $25,000.00. 
The Book further shows that the defendant was pre-
sent at this meeting. However, all of the witnesses, 
for both the plaintiff and defendant, testified that 
at all times when the plaintiff corporation was 
formed and later while it was operating, that the 
defendant told all of the directors of the corporation 
that he would not pay the corporation any money 
either for stock or dues for services as long as a Mr. 
Duane White was connected with the corporation 
and that everyone knew this because the defendant 
thought that Mr. White was dishonest (see deposi-
tion of Gerald Whitaker, Page 7 and 8). It proved 
later that the defendan't estimation of Mr. White was 
correct, as he embezzled some $2,000.00 from the 
corporation and was forced to leave the corporation 
for that reason in March of 1956. 
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After Mr. White left the corporation, defendant 
did pay for his stock and made certain "dues" pay-
ments to the corporation; however, not on the basis 
of the rate set up in the January 3, 1956 meeting. 
In fact, the plaintiff corporation did not change 
those rates to any of its members at that particular 
time. (See trial transcript pages 
Thereafter, the plaintiff corporation attempted 
to bill the defendant on the basis of the January 3, 
1956 minute entry, and defendant refused to pay 
on the basis but agreed to pay on the same basis of 
the other members of the corporation, stating that 
the jobs could not stand such a high fee for the 
materials estimate. 
Issues were framed and the case proceeded to 
trial before the court without jury and resulted in a 
judgement by the court in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant in the amount of $3,626.00 
plus $435.12 interest and costs, on a contract which 
called for the payment of 1% of amount received 
by defendant for all jobs up to $10,000.00; 2o/o of all 
jobs in excess of $10,000.00 and not over $25,000.00; 
and 3°/o on all jobs in excess of $25,000.00. 
Statement of Points: 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRE,D IN FINDING THAT 
ANY CONTRACT WAS EVER MADE BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND OEFENDANT AS THERE IS NOT 
EVIDENCE TO SHOW SUCH A CONTRACT. 
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·POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A 
CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFEND-
ANT, BECAUSE UNDER ANY AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE TWO, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT BOUND 
TO DO ANYTHING, SO THERE WAS A LACK OF 
CONSIDERATION. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE ALL OF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWS CLEARLY THAT IF THERE WAS AN 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DE-
FENDANT, THAT PLA-INTIFF FIRST BREACHED 
THE AGREEMENT AND SO SHOULD NOT BE EN~ 
TITLED TO RECOVER UNDER THE AGREEMENT. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE IF THERE WAS AN 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFEND-
ANT, IT VIOLATES SECTION 25-5-4 U.C.A. 1953 
AS AMENDED, IN THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS 
NOT IN WRITING. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF UNDER AN AGREEMENT BE-
CAUSE SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS VOID AND UN-
ENFORCIBLE BECAUSE IT VIOLATES PUBUC 
POLICY AND SECTION 50-1-6 U.C.A. 1953, AS A-
MENDED, IN THAT IT IS A RESTRAINT OF TRADE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THA11 
ANY CONTRACT WAS EVER MADE BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT AS THERE IS NOT 
EVIDENCE TO SHOW SUCH A CONTRACT. 
From the evidence submitted at the trial it be-
:omes evident that plaintiff is depending upon one 
Jf two items submitte·d as evidence to support their 
:laim that a contract was made between plaintiff 
and defendant. One would be the articles of in-
corporation in which the so-called or alleged pur-
pose of the organiation were set out. Of course, 
these articles of incorporation do not contain any 
provisions whatsoever for the defendant to do; they 
do indicate the purpose for which the organization 
was organized, but in no way do they bind anyone 
to deal with the plaintiff; therefore, there is a com-
plete lack of a contract contained in the articles of 
incorporation. Plaintiff herein submitted to the 
court as evidence the memorandum of the meeting 
note in which it was listed that certain sums were to 
be paid to the corporation by members. At this time, 
there was nothing said whatsoever about what the 
plaintiff was to do for these services, only that 
certain sums were to be paid to it by certain mem-
bers o£ the corporation. Further, at this particular 
time, all of the evidence from both plaintiff's and 
defendant's witnesses stated that the defendant in 
this action at the time this motion was made told 
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everyone connected with the organization that as 
long as Mr. White was connected with the organi-
ation, he would pay no sums of money to the organ-
ization. Therefore, at the time this motion was pass-
ed, the defendant specifically told everyone that 
he would not agree to anything, and therefore no 
contract was made. 
It might be plaintiff's contention that later when 
the afore-said Mr. White was found to be dishonest 
after he stole in excess of $2,000.00 from the corpor-
ation, that the defendant then paid some sums of 
money into the corporation, thereby agreeing to 
the terms of the agrement. However, the evidence 
is clear that at the time the defendant paid money 
into the corporation, the corporation was not itself 
following its own rules of the aforesaid meeting 
minutes in billing its members. It was merely plac-
ing figures, which apparently had no relationship 
to the meeting minutes as set out, and as shown 
by plaintiff's own witnesses on cross examination 
these figures were followed. (See transcript pages 
CJ I - '1 ~ ). In some instances these figures 
were higher than the aforesaid rates as contained 
in the minute meetings, and in most other instances 
they were many, many times lower than the afore-
said rates. Therefore, if plaintiff acquiesced to any-
thing at all, he would acquiesce to paying only 
those rates the other members were paying, and 
not those rates as were indicated in the minutes of 
the meeting, which were submitted to the court as 
evidence in this case. It is defendant's position, how-
ever, that he acquiesced in nothing; that he merely 
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presented money to the corporation in order to go 
along with the rest of the group. The evidence 
clearly shows he at no time after specifically deny-
ing that he would pay any money to the corporation 
agreed later to pay any specific rates to the corpor-
ation; and therefore, no contract was ever made be-
tween the I='laintiff corporation and the defendant. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A 
CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFEND-
ANT, BECAUSE UNDER ANY AGREEMENT BE--
TWEEN THE TWO, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT BOUND 
TO DO ANYTHING, SO THERE WAS A LACK OF 
CONSIDERATION. 
If there was an agreement between the plaintiff 
and defendant, all the evidence shows that the 
plaintiff corporation was not bound to do anything 
whatsoever. Certain purposes for the existence of 
the said corporation were listed in the articles of 
incorporation, but there was nothing in them to 
bind them to do anything. The plaintiff corporation 
could have and did fail to supply defendant with 
many of the bids. This was admitted by plaintiff's 
own witnesses, and there was nothing that plaintif1 
could do about it. If that is what.the corporation was 
supposed to do, they failed to do it; and there is no 
place in any agreement b.etween the plaintiff and 
defendant which required the corporation to do this. 
Therefore, the corporation cannot claim that there 
was an agreement between the plaintiff and the 
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defendant because the corporation was not legally 
bound and there was _no consideration on the part 
of the corporatio.n for plaintiffs promises to do any-
thing. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE ALL OF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWS CLEARLY THAT IF THERE WAS AN A-
GREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFEND-
ANT/ THAT PLAINTIFF FIRST BREACHED THE 
AGREEMENT AND SO SHOULD NOT BE ENTITL-
ED TO RECOVER UNDER THE AGREEMENT. 
If there was an agreement between plaintiff cor-
poration and defendant, that agreement certainly 
contained terms other than those stated in the pur-
pose of the existence of the organization. The plain-
tiff's own witnesses said that certain members of 
the organization joined. the organization for the pur-
pose of investing funds and that promises were 
made to the members of the organization that the 
profits and fees collected from this organization 
were to be invested and that this -would be a very 
fine invesment opportunity. (See Gerald L. Whit-
aker Deposition PP 17). Some members of the cor-
poration joined solely for that purpose, and had no 
interest whatsoever in the so-called service provid-
ed by the corporation and of supplying quantity 
estimates to its members. Since that was part of the 
consideration for some of the members for joining, 
and the evidence is clear on the subject that the 
plaintiff corporation at no time while defendant 
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was a member of said corporation made any in .. 
vestments; the plaintiff failed to carry out the terms 
of its agreement with its members. Therefore, plain-
tiff should be denied any relief in this action since 
plaintiff first breached the so-called contract. Fur-
ther, if it was definitely established that an agree-
ment existed, it was a part of the agreement that 
plaintiff organization should supply all its members 
with all of the estimates on all of the jobs they did. 
The evidence is clear from all of the witnesses that 
the plaintiff failed to do this and thereby broke the 
terms of their agreement, if such agreement existed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF BECAUSE IF THERE WAS AN 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DE-
FENDANT, IT VIOLATES SECTION 25-5-4 U.C.A. 
1953 AS AMENDED, IN THAT THE AGREEMENT 
WAS NOT IN WRITING. 
This agreement was to run for an indefinite 
period of time, which was in the contemplation of 
all parties to be more than one year, and therefore 
the said agreement must be in writing in order to 
be in force under the aforesaid Utah statute. The 
case of Burk vs Superflo Mfg. Co., 78 Atlantic 2d, 
698, held where an agreement between two busi 
ness concerns whereby plaintiff, a co-partnership, 
agreed to solicit orders for plumbing tools and sup-
plies manufactured by defendant, contained no 
provisions for termination of the agreement, but left 
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time for performance enterely open; the agree-
ment was unenforcible as a contract not to be per-
formed within one year. The alleged agreement in 
this case is of the exact same type as the agreement 
in the above case. This agrement was of an indef-
inite period, and all the parties thereto contem-
plated that it would run for more than one year. 
There were no provisions made for termination of 
the agrement, which was a big factor in the above 
entitled case, and the said agreement has no mem-
orandum or anything at all signed by the defendant 
with which the plaintiff can hope to show as a mem-
orandum in writing of this agreement. Therefore, 
the agreement should not be enforced. 
The case of Pochall vs Anderson, 91 Southwest 
2d 1050, 127 Texas 251, is the case where an em-
ployer agreed to pay a ranch foreman an annual 
bonus. This agreement had no time provision and 
did not contain a method of termination and the 
court in that case held that it was within the statute 
of frauds and therefore unenforcible, since the 
agreement was not in writing. The following cases 
from the following states also contain the same pro-
vision: North Carolina; Choate Rental Company vs 
Justice, 193, S.E. 817, 212 NC 523; Kentucky: Utili-
ties Co. vs Hurst 269 S.W. 525; Maine: Long Cope 
vs Lucerne 143 Atlantic 64; Mississippi: Garrachi vs 
Sherwin Williams Paint Co. 125 South 410; Tennes-
see: Deapon vs Tennessee Coal Co. 12 Heish 650; 
Texas: Harper vs Loftown & Improvement Co. 228 
S.W. 188; Washington: Sish Clearing House vs 
Melchon Co., 25 Pac. 2d, 381. The Oklahoma courts 
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have also followed the above doctrine. Further, 
Corbin on contracts, Sec. 446, states that the courts 
of these jurisdictions and other follow this view. 
There can be no question in this case that there was 
no agreement in writing and therefore this contract 
is unenforcible as a violation of Utah statute of 
frauds. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF UNDER AN AGREEMENT BE-
CAUSE SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS VOID AND UN-
ENFORCIBLE BECAUSE IT VIOLATES PUBLIC 
POLICY AND SECTION 50-1-6 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, IN THAT IT IS A RESTRAINT OF 
TRADE. 
Section 50-1-1 U.C.A. 1953 as amended, reads: 
"Combinations to co-ntrol prices forbid-
den- Any combination having for its object 
or effort the controlling of prices of any pro-
fessional services, any products of the soiL 
any articles of manufacturing or commerce: 
or the cost of exxchange or transportation, is 
prohibited and declared unlawful." 
Section 50-l-6 U.C.A. 1953 as amended, reads: 
"Forbidden Contracts void- Any contract 
or agreement in violation of any provision of 
this chapter shall be absolutely void." 
17 C.J.S.· Sec. 238 Page 622, reads as follows: 
"5. Agreement in restraint of trade in 
general. - A contract which in its terms is an 
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unreasonable restraint of trade is invalid as 
agaist upblic policy ... " 
- 12 Am Jur, Sec. 167 pp 662 has a similar state-
ment, and Williston on Contracts Vol. 5, Sec. 1663, 
is in complete agreement with this statement. 
And the Restatement of Contracts, Section 
517, says: 
"A bargain not to bid at an auction, or 
any public competition for a sale or contract, 
having as its primary object to stifle com-
petition, is illegal." 
Illustration 6 under Sec. 517 reads: 
A, B, C and D, building Contractors, 
agree with one another to form X association 
and that in future bids for the award of build-
ing contracts the successful bidder shall pay 
X association 2<>fo of the gross amount of the 
price fixed in the contract awarded. The 
agreement between A, B, C and Dis illegal.'' 
It is clear from the above that the present case 
is exactly the same as illustration 6. A group of con-
tractors. formed the plaintiff corporation and agreed 
. . ' 
to give it 1, 2 or 3% of the successful bidders' jobs. 
It is against public policy because it stifles compet-
ition among Masonry Contractors. 
The courts throughout the nation have found 
.this to be the case and have declared such contracts 
void as against public policy. 
This case is so near the case of Masterbuilders 
Assn .. of Kansas vs Carson 269 Pac 693, that it would 
be hard to find two cases with .the fact situation as 
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similar. In the Masterbuilders Assn. of Kansas case 
there was a contract entered into whereby the de-
fendant agreed to pay the plaintiff association 1/2 of 
1 per cent of a contract price over $10,000.00. One-
half of this amount was to go to the association and 
the remaining one-half was to be distributed equal-
ly to the five lowest unsuccessful bidders in the con-
tract. The association was an association of con-
tractors in Kansas. Unlike the present case, this was 
not a corporation, and the corporation could not 
keep the profits itself. The defendant in that case 
contested the bill owed to the plainti£f on the 
grounds that this contract was against public pol-
icy. In that case, as in the present case, the plaintiff 
organization furnished quantities estimates to its 
members, just as the plaintiff corporation in this 
case does. The court says that a contract by mem-
bers of a voluntary contractors' association in as-
sessing a fee upon each member of a percentage 
of the contract price of any public contract secured 
by him is against public policy and void regardless 
of the lawful intent o£ the parties in making it; and 
it is a further fact that the public may not have bee:g 
injured in a particular instance. The court held this 
.. contract to be void as against public policy for three 
specific reasons: (1) That the contractor is likely to 
add the cost of •this service to his bid and therefore 
pass it on to the consumer. (2) That five others who 
did not do any services or any work for this, bene-
fited from the contractor's bid, and (3) Free com-
petition is diminished where all contractors use the 
same service from the same source. 
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This case is so close to the present case, that 
it is difficult to find any difference whatsoever. 
Under this case, the contractors formed an assoc-
iation, a profit making corporation, and that corpor-
ation was to supply quantities estimates to its mem-
bers and the fees to be paid were a percentage of 
the winning contractor's winning bid. In this case, 
a much greater percentage than in the Kansas case. 
In the Kansas case the percentage was 1/2 of 1 per 
cent of the contract price over $10,000.00. In the 
present case, the plaintiff is seeking to recover 1 
per cent of the contract price on small contracts, 2 
per cent on larger contracts and 3 per cent on even 
larger contracts. 
This case fits on all fours with the Kansas case. 
Number l, the contractor is likely to add the costs 
of this service to the consumer. This was in accord-
ance with all of the evidence given in this case. 
Plaintiff's own witness, Mr. Whitaker, when his de-
position was taken, stated in that deposition that 
when he figured the amount to be charged to each 
contractor, he would first subtract a percentage of 
the bid from the total contract price before taking 
the percentage, because it was his idea that the 
contractor had added that percentage to his bid 
before submitting the bid. Therefore, all the parties 
involved contemplated that the contractor would 
add this cost to the consumer and therefore the 
prices would go ·up. Number 2, those who did not 
give any service would benefit in the winning con-
t'ractor's business. In the Kansas case, only the five 
other bidders were to benefit; but in the present 
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case, all of the other bidders were members of this 
organization and would benefit, because this is a 
profit making corporation, which was to invest the 
profits herefrom in other corporations and distrib-
ute the funds to all of its members, and therefore all 
of the members were to benefit, without giving 
service to the corporation. Number 3, the corpor-
ation, of course, contemplated that all of the con-
tractors would use the same service from the same 
source and this service would be an exceptionally 
high priced source. The evidence given by plain-
tiff's own witnesses is that the cost to the wining 
member of the corporation which might be $900 in 
one case for its service, to an outside member 
would run between $20 and $50. What a drastic 
increase for the so-called service provided by this 
corporation to its members; which increase was to 
be passed on to the public, and which increase 
was to be shared in by all of the unsuccessful bid-
ders, as being members of this corporation. (See 
Deposition of Gerald Whitaker, page 19 and 20). 
All the cases that can be found are in agree-
ment with the Masterbuilders Assn. of Kansas vs 
Carson case; that is to say that where the above 
three factors are present, there is not a case on the 
books which does not hold that these contracts 
are against public policy. Kentucky Assn. vs Will-
iams, 280 Southwest 937, was a case where a fee 
of 1/4 of 1 per cent on all work, plus $50 was to be 
paid to the association contractors. Plaintiff argued 
that this fee was reasonable, and therefore not 
against public policy. The court held that the de-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
termination is the general tendency at the time of 
the contract was made and if opposed to the inter-
est of the public, then the contract is invalid even 
though no injury to the public would result in the 
particular case, and further took judicial notice of the 
fact that it is human nature to place the cost of this 
membership in this organization on the contract 
price and shift it to the public. A case of the Con-
tractor's Association of Western Pennsylvania vs 
Seeds et at 15 At 2d 467, was a case where the con-
tractors were engaged. in heavy building and con-
struction work. Members were to pay 1/10 of 1 per 
cent of the gross amount -of each contract in the 
area covered by the association. The contract was 
in the form of a by-law; and this contract was held 
void ·as against public policy. It is quoted in the 
Restatement of Contracts, Vol. II, P. 5-18 and the Ken-
tucky Assn. case above. It is held that the defendant 
would recoup the fee by adding it to the contract 
price, and therefore was against public policy; and 
that the by-law has a direct tendency to injure the 
public and effect competitive building in that these 
parties were all using the same service and there-
fore there would be no competition whatsoever in 
this bid and it gave the members who were un-
successful in the bidding an interest in the contract 
and this was against public policy. 
The Associated Wisconsin Contractors vs La-
thers Day of 1940, 291 N.W. 770, was a case where 
the plaintiff was seeking to recover from the mem-
bers of a highway contractors group, who signed 
an agreement of the by-laws of the association, 
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wherein each member was to pay 1/4 of l per cent 
of the contract price. This court held that this was 
against public policy, for the same reason as the 
above cases. Case of Bailey et al vs. Association of 
Master Plumbers, 52 S.W. 853, is where plaintiff 
was a non-profit corporation; each member was 
required to report in open meeting his jobs and if 
his work was completed. They were to pay $7.50 per 
bathtub and $7.50 per water closet installed. The 
court held that this was against public policy, as it 
was destruction oE free competition among its mem-
bers; it increased the price to the consumer, and the .. 
provision was obviously an unreasonable restraint 
upon trade, and being so, it is contrary to the pub-
lic policy and void under the common law of the 
country. 
The case of the Electrical Contractors Assn. of 
Chicago vs. Shulman Electric 57 N.E. 2d 220, 324 
Ill. Appellate 28, is a case where plaintiff had an 
action to recover dues resulting from by-laws 
wherein the members were to pay .4 of l per cent 
of all construction and merchandizing business to 
the organization. Here it was contended that this 
was against public policy and the court held in 
this case that this was not against public policy; 
however, this case is in complete agreement with 
the principles advanced in the foregoing cases. 
The difference in this case was that this corporation 
was a non-profit corporation and the losing bidders 
would not share in the bids of the successful bid-
ders' contracts. Secondly, this court did not feel 
in this particular case that the percentage charged 
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would be added to the costs; and for these two rea-
sons this court held this agreement to be not against 
public policy. However, the case itself indicates 
that had the court found these two factors present 
as was present in the other cases, and is present 
in the case here, that the contract would have been 
against public policy. 
Griffits & Sprague Stove Co. vs Waterfront Emp. 
Assn. of Pacific Coast (C.A. 9) 162 Fed. 29th 1017, 
has been cited as holding opposite to the above 
cases. It is appellant's contention that the Griffith's 
case has no standing here as it is not at all similar 
to the present case. In that case, the plaintiff was a 
non-profit corporation, which is very important. The 
members are persons or firms engaged in the bus-
iness of carrying cargo by water on Pacific Coast 
ports. The organiation was formed to deal with the 
longshoremen and to represent the members in 
dealing with longshoremen on working condition 
and other factors. In other words, it was an employ-
ers' organization organized solely for the purpose 
of dealing with the unions. The membership dues 
were to be 2 1/2 cents per ton carried by the mem-
bers. However, there is no showing in that case 
whatsoever that the members were directly bidding 
against each other to obtain jobs and that the 2 1/2 
cents per ton were to .be added to the job costs. 
The court in that case did find that the agreement 
was not against p_ublic policy and that defendant 
would have had to pay someone for these services 
had he not paid plaintiff corporation and that the 
fee in question was reasonable in light of the serv-
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ices performed. In that case, many factors were not 
present which are present in this case. These factors 
are (l) Plaintiff corporation was a non-profit corpor-
ation and the other members therefore were not to 
share in the dues paid in by members of the cor-
poration. (2) There was no showing of competition 
between the members of the corporation, and that 
the 2 l/2 cents per ton membership dues would 
be added to the cost to the ultimate consumer. 
Therefore the Griffith's case is not in point and 
should not even be considered; when deciding the 
question now before the court. 
A further element to this same question has 
been added by the testimony in this case. It has 
been brought out under the testimony that the mem-
bers of the organization contended that a bid de-
pository would be operated. (See Transcript pp. 9? .) 
Although this was not done, it was a part of the 
contemplation of the parties. The bid depository was 
to be operated wherein bids would be opened be-
fore the public opening was had, and wherein the 
bighest and lowest bid was to be thrown out. This, 
therefore, would raise the price of masonry work 
and increase the costs or masonry work to the 
public. This is without a question, against public 
policy and therefore should void the contract. 
This type contract and organiz~tion is against 
public policy as it requires successful masonry con-
tractors to support and maintain unsuccessful ones. 
The successful bidders would be paying for the 
entire costs of the services while those who never 
got any bids whatsoever would still reap a pro-
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maintained completely by him from the inefficient 
contractor and would be allowing him to stay in 
business, which is against the free enterprise sy-
stem of America; wherein the doctrine of free com-
petition, where the efficient survive and the ineffic-
ient must seek other types of work, is here violated 
and therefore· this alleged agreement is void as 
against public policy. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that there was no evidence from 
which the court could determine that the parties 
hereto had entered into a contract and that if there 
was an agreement that plaintiff was not bound to 
do anything thereunder so that the agreement 
lacked consideration. Further that plaintiff did not 
perform as expected by the members of plaintiff 
corporation, so plaintiff first breached any agree-
ment which existed. It is also clear that any agree-
ment of this type is against public policy and is 
therefore void and unenforcible. 
For these reasons, the judgment should be 
reversed, with directions to enter a judgment dis-
missing plaintiff's cause and awarding defendant 
his costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted by: 
NORMAN WADE, 
Attorney for Appellant 
and Defendant 
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